Few enterprises have inl uenced the course of human civilization more than the domestication of animals. Our ancient bond with domestic animals predates many of the most important milestones in human history, including the development of agriculture, the establishment of cities, and the invention of writing. With animals by our sides, we became better clothed, better fed, and better warriors. We became stronger, faster, and more mobile. Domestic animals have accompanied humans across the globe since Paleolithic days, and they have helped us dominate every biome that we have encountered along the way. Meanwhile, the partnership has proven no less transformative for the animals involved. They are now distributed around the world in cosmopolitan fashion, and they have terraformed the planet almost as much as we have. From an evolutionary perspective, the bond has proven exceedingly advantageous, and domestic animals now vastly outnumber their closest wild brethren.
To understand how domestic animals have transformed human populations, and vice versa, one must recognize three salient facts. First, the domestication of animals was not something that happened a long time ago. On the contrary, it happens every day. You see, more than anything else, domestication is a relationship . In this case, it is a relationship among billions of partners from multiple species lasting thousands of years, but it is a relationship just the same. And, like any relationship, it requires sustained effort if it is going to l ourish. Nothing is guaranteed. The ancient covenant must be forged anew every generation -or not. This leads to our second fact: things fall apart. Not always, but sometimes, and when they do, it is not uncommon for the parties involved to go their separate ways. If any erstwhile domestic animals survive their breakup with humanity and successfully establish residency in the "wild," free from direct anthropogenic selection, those animals and their progeny are technically neither wild nor domestic, and are instead relabeled feral . Thus our third and i nal fact: If we really want to understand our complicated relationship with domestic animals, then we cannot simply ignore the ones who went feral.
Like their closest cousins, feral animals were once joined with humanity in the coevolutionary embrace known as domestication, but something went wrong and the bond disappeared. This fact renders them unique among life on Earth, for they alone have known both our warm embrace and our cold shoulder. Fair or not, they are dei ned by what turned out to be a l eeting tryst. This perspective has left them with a fascinating, if not always l attering, perspective on human history. For thousands of years, they have stalked the periphery of human habitats, haunting l esh-and-bone reminders of a broken symbiosis, bearing silent witness to our worse and better natures. This is more than just literary hyperbole, by the way. It is also a scientii c fact. Domestication affects an animal's physical and psychical constitution in profound ways, and humanity's i ngerprints remain inscribed on the animal's genome long after the coevolutionary partnership breaks down. As a result, feral animals are subject to unique selective pressures quite distinct from those shaping their closest domestic and wild conspecii cs. 1 This is by no means the i rst work to examine ferality. As a matter of fact, biologists have recognized feral animals as discrete objects of scientii c analysis for hundreds of years. When the French naturalist Comte de Buffon belittled North America's supposedly degenerate fauna in the late eighteenth century, he cited the continent's feral animals among his evidence.
2 In response to this sleight, Thomas Jefferson, a proud son of the New World, protested that America's feral animals were no more degenerate than those in Europe.
3 A century later, British naturalist Charles Darwin famously cited domestic animals as evidence in favor of natural selection, but what is less well known is that he also cited feral animals. 4 So too did his countryman, the co-discoverer of natural selection, Alfred Russell Wallace, when he independently articulated the exact same principle.
5 As concern for global biodiversity intensii ed during the twentieth century, many biologists quit celebrating feral animals as exemplars of evolution and began disparaging them as "invasive" pests who ought to be destroyed. 6 Most biologists continue to advocate for (or consent to) the annihilation of feral populations around the globe, though some scientists now champion the protection of some feral populations for varying reasons.
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Despite all the attention that scientists have devoted to feral animals over the years, they have still not resolved what, precisely, qualii es as a feral animal. Most apply the feral label to any animal who was once domesticated, or had domesticated ancestors, but who now lives in the "wild." Note that this dei nition assigns feral status to both the initial founder strays and all of their progeny thereafter.
7 According to this deinition, feralization begins in that moment when two previously engaged actors start to drift apart and the bonds between them start to disappear. Some researchers have described the feralization process as "domestication in reverse," but that is not entirely accurate. After all, ferality is really more of a post -domestication state.
8 Others think we ought to reserve the feral designation for animals who live and reproduce completely independent of humans, and thereby distinguish true feral animals from commensal "pariahs" who live in human-built environments and who subsist on human scraps.
9 Some complain that the feral label fails to convey the profound behavioral changes that attend feralization, and therefore use the "wild" adjective when describing once-domesticated populations.
10 Still others express concern that, unlike "wild," which has ennobling connotations, "feral" has negative connotations, relegating feral animals to the "low status of ecological pests"
11
Biologists are not the only professionals who have shown an increased interest in feral animals over the years. Historians have also produced an impressive body of scholarship analyzing the unique role that feral populations have played in human history. Alfred Crosby has discussed their inl uence in several works, revealing that feral animals helped Europeans colonize other continents beginning in the i fteenth century.
12 Elinor Melville has shown that feral sheep transformed landscapes and societies in sixteenth-century Mexico.
13 Virginia DeJohn Anderson's research has demonstrated that feral animals helped English colonists establish and expand their presence in eastern North America throughout the seventeenth century.
14 Meanwhile, Harriet Ritvo's work on the Chillingham cattle of northern England has proven that feral populations often served as vehicles for human desires in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
15 These classic texts helped establish feral animals as viable subjects for historical inquiry, and a growing number of writers have now begun to probe the complicated nature of ferality.
16
This book attempts something slightly different. The narrative traces humanity's ancient relationship with domestic animals, the extent to which that relationship has experienced feralization over the years, and the evolutionary consequences for all parties involved. Its emphasis on Feral Animals in the American South 4 evolution places the project squarely within the burgeoning i eld of study known as "evolutionary history," which examines how humans and other species have shaped each other's gene pools over the years. This method of analysis acknowledges that humans have shaped the evolutionary fate of other species (intentionally or otherwise) for millennia, and that this human-induced evolution has, in turn, transformed human history. In other words, human and nonhuman populations have, in a very real sense, coevolved with one another. The coevolutionary hypothesis has proved especially popular among those who study domestication. Michael Pollan famously employed this method to great effect when studying domestic plants in Botany of Desire , though others have since applied the same method to domestic animals.
17 Edmund Russell, who was the i rst to truly dei ne evolutionary history as a distinct i eld of inquiry, has examined the evolutionary history of animals in several publications, and numerous others have since followed suit. 18 These works are important contributions to historical scholarship, but none of them focus on domestication's ephemerality, and none of them satisfactorily answer the still-pressing questions: What happens when our braided coevolutionary trajectories start to unravel? What happens to the animals we no longer need?
To assess the evolutionary effects of domestication and feralization on a given population, the narrative tracks three different variables over time: biogeographical distribution, genetic composition, and behavioral engagement with humans. These variables reveal that the distinction between domesticity and ferality is never clear-cut, and that humanity's innumerable interactions with other animals fall somewhere on a spectrum between total engagement and total indifference. In the case of biogeographic distribution, animals who live in enclosed spaces like crates, pastures, or apartments would fall closer to the domesticated end of the spectrum than animals who walk wherever they please, without any sort of human-imposed restrictions. The same holds true for genetic composition. Some populations are subject to intense anthropogenic manipulation in the name of sustenance, recreation, or vanity, while others reproduce of their own accord, without any input from people. Finally, tracking each population's behavioral engagement with humanity is essential to demarcating domestic and feral animals, but drawing distinctions is not always easy. Some animals have never willfully engaged humans, yet they owe their existence to anthropogenic intervention. Others are carefully chosen and then deliberately abandoned, all so they can better emulate their pre-domesticated ancestors.
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In cases like these, it is not at all clear whether the animals in question are wild, domestic, or feral.
Studying ferality also provides one with a fresh perspective on the long-running wilderness debate. As environmental historians of North America are well aware, the idea of wilderness has meant a great many things to a great many people over the years. The earliest European visitors considered the entire continent an unsettled wilderness, despite the fact that millions of people already lived there. They viewed the continent as something to be conquered and dominated, and they proceeded accordingly. Then, at precisely the same time that the "frontier" closed, saving the last remnants of wilderness assumed paramount importance among the nation's most urbane individuals. Consequently, when Roderick Nash examined the idea of wilderness in 1967, he placed nature and culture on opposite ends of a spectrum.
19 A generation later, William Cronon noted that viewing wilderness as something apart from humans leaves no room for humans, and therefore undermines our efforts to exist with nature.
20
Most of the scholarly discussion about wilderness since then has highlighted the "hybrid" nature of wilderness, which is at once natural and constructed. 21 This project demonstrates that the same false distinctions between "wild" and "artii cial" apply to animals no less than landscapes. Determining whether a given population qualii es as wild, domestic, or feral requires that one tease apart the animals' respective evolutionary histories, and this, in turn, requires familiarity with the historical record.
In an effort to limit what would otherwise prove an impossible scope, the narrative limits its analysis of domestic animals to three of history's most conspicuous species: dogs, 22 pigs, 23 and horses. 24 Each of these animals entered domestication at different times, in different places, and under drastically different circumstances. Chapter 2 introduces each of these animals, and then explains how they i rst became acquainted with humans. Though people and animals independently entered domestication at many different times and in many different places (including the Americas, Africa, and Oceania), dogs, pigs, and horses all entered domestication in prehistoric Eurasia. 25 More precise details are not always forthcoming, but combing the archaeological record and the genetic data sheds considerable light on the origins of domestication. These analyses demonstrate that the reproductive boundaries distinguishing wild, domestic, and feral populations remained relatively illdei ned for several thousand years. 
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This emphasis on the origins of domestication should also improve our understanding of humanity's larger relationship with the rest of nature. After all, scientists and scholars agree that humans are the primary force shaping the evolution of life on Earth, and that we now live in a new, human-dominated geological epoch known as the Anthropocene. Even so, it is not at all clear when this so-called epoch actually began. Many believe that it began in the eighteenth century, when the Industrial Revolution started producing major atmospheric changes. Others insist that humanity's impact was not really felt on a global scale until the midtwentieth century, but that human activities have greatly accelerated since the end of World War II. Still others have pushed the needle in the opposite direction, noting that humans have engineered their ecosystems for millennia, and that the origin of agriculture thus denotes the beginning of the Anthropocene. This project agrees that domestication provides the most explicit demarcation of the human-controlled world, but it reminds readers that the domestication of animals preceded the domestication of plants by thousands of years.
27
Subsequent chapters recount how humans have interacted with each of these three species in one specii c place: the American South.
28
Since this region is notoriously difi cult to dei ne, a few extra words are perhaps in order. After all, any study that purports to examine the American South probably ought to examine the entire southern half of the modern-day United States (including, presumably, Hawaii ), but they never do. Historians have suggested that we study the southern half of the continental United States as a single region, a Sun Belt, but relatively few scholars have answered the call. 29 When most people talk about the South, they are talking about the southeastern quadrant of North America. Pressed for specii cs, they would probably equate the South with the eleven states that briel y formed a Confederacy in the early 1860s.
30 Sure enough, most environmental histories of "the South" focus on the southeastern quadrant.
31
Tradition notwithstanding, this book draws a still tighter geographic focus. The narrative trains its attention on that part of North America that lies east of the Appalachian Mountains and south of the Potomac River. This region is composed of modern-day Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida (see Figure 1 ). There are legitimate reasons for treating the region as a distinct ecological theater. For example, the i ve states share more than a thousand miles of coastline along the Atlantic Ocean, and this has affected the region's culture, ecology, and identity in profound ways. Meanwhile, the Appalachian Mountains have inl uenced settlement patterns, agricultural practices, and trade networks in southeastern North America for thousands of years. As a result, communities to the west of the mountains have developed in subtly different ways from those to the east. 32 In similar fashion, communities in the Gulf of Mexico watershed have developed differently from those in the Atlantic Ocean watershed. 33 For these reasons, the narrative focuses on the region east of the Appalachians and south of the Potomac, though it should be noted that this region is by no means homogenous. It contains three distinct physiographic zones (ancient highlands, 34 piedmont plateau, 35 and coastal lowlands 36 ), and while most of the region is temperate and experiences four distinct seasons, the southern half of Florida is subtropical and experiences just two seasons (dry and wet).
37
Finally, readers should note that while the narrative refers to this region as "the South" for the sake of brevity and convenience, it readily acknowledges that there are, in fact, many Souths.
38
Because none of the book's four main characters are native to the American South, Chapter 3 explains how they all came to populate the region. People and dogs i rst arrived in the region more than 11,000 years ago, and they were joined by pigs and horses (and still more people and dogs) in the early sixteenth century, but it was not until the English intensii ed colonization efforts in Virginia during the early seventeenth century that the number of domestic and feral animals began to skyrocket. Colonists famously encouraged their livestock to roam free, showing virtually no regard for the Native Americans who already lived there, or their quite legitimate claim to i rst dibs on everything. Meanwhile, dogs were deeply engaged with people of every stripe during the colonial period, but neither their range nor their reproduction was closely monitored. When additional settlers established additional colonies in the Carolinas, Georgia, and Florida, the exact same patterns were repeated, with subtle regional variations. By the late eighteenth century, feral animals drastically outnumbered domestic animals in certain places, a fact that meant different things for the region's rapidly changing collection of Native American, European, and African peoples.
39
Studying feral animals during the colonial period also allows one to engage the large body of literature on the so-called southern frontier. 40 More than eighty years after his death, historian Frederick Jackson Turner remains the looming i gure in this historiography. According to Turner, the southern frontier was dei ned by the same settlement patterns that dei ned the frontier elsewhere. Namely, the trading frontier
The trouble with ferality 9 gave way to the livestock frontier, which gave way to the agriculture frontier, which gave way to the industrial frontier. 41 Historians now dismiss Turner's interpretation as too ethnocentric, but his thesis remains a lightning rod all these years later. Allan Greer suggests that we redei ne Turner's frontier as "the zone of conl ict between the indigenous commons and the colonial (outer) commons."
42 Others suggest that we relabel the frontier something else entirely, like "the commons," "the backcountry," "the interior," "the shatter zone," and "the borderlands." 43 Meanwhile, historian Mart Stewart reminds us that the frontier means something entirely different in the South, where wilderness has always been more proximate, where nature has always been " inhabited ."
44
Chapter 4 examines the peculiar customs and institutions that prevailed in the South from the early national period to the end of the Civil War (roughly 1783 to 1865). More densely settled parts of the United States had long since abandoned open-range husbandry, but the practice continued without abatement in the South, with different implications for different species. As John Majewski and Viken Tchakerin recently demonstrated, the large tracts of "unimproved" land that covered the region during the nineteenth century were not untouched wilderness that had never been utilized. Instead, most of that land had already been intensively cultivated at some point in the recent past and then allowed to lie fallow for decades. This method of shifting cultivation not only created the "demographic equivalent of a permanent frontier," but also provided feral animals with habitats in which to live. 45 What is more, all people in the South engaged with feral populations during this era, no matter their ancestry, but their interactions with the animals revealed unequal power structures among humans.
46
Signii cantly, the reproductive distinctions separating domestic and feral animals started to grow more pronounced during this period, and, as a result, populations started to cleave. Invariably, some members of each species were targeted for increased anthropogenic manipulation, and this meant new selective parameters. A growing number of horses, pigs, and dogs were specii cally cultivated to serve a variety of technological, agricultural, and martial purposes. Despite these initiatives, however, many animals remained free-ranging and genetically undifferentiated during the antebellum period. Once again, this meant different things for different species, each of which boasted unique ecological footprints and unique rates of fecundity. Feral populations were alternately subdued, ignored, or resented. The populations of all animals, both domestic and feral, decreased dramatically in the early Chapter 5 examines the period from the end of the Civil War to the end of World War II (1865-1945), a period characterized by increased industrialization, mechanization, and urbanization. These processes developed more slowly in the South than other parts of the nation, but they developed just the same. The growing number of people who lived in the region (most of whom were descended from Europeans, Africans, or both) became increasingly entrenched in national markets and gene l ows, with quite different implications for the region's animal populations. The region's wealthiest planters tried to close the open range on numerous occasions following the wake of the Civil War, but they were consistently thwarted by an unlikely coalition of "poor whites" and "poor blacks," who continued to range their livestock on the commons. This fact is signii cant. Scholars sometimes assume that race has always trumped class in the South, but the debate over fencing livestock (especially feral pigs) shows that people of different ancestries often engaged animals in similar ways. In due course, however, human population densities continued to increase and, slowly but surely, the open range collapsed in piecemeal fashion. 48 Meanwhile, industrialization drastically increased demand for horses, and, as a result, the number of equids living in the region continued to grow throughout the late nineteenth century. Despite this growth, the southeastern states had still not recovered their prewar complement of horses by 1900. Wartime devastation was partly to blame, but the bigger culprit was the region's preference for horse/ donkey hybrids known as mules. In the early twentieth century, revolutionary advances in technology and transportation devastated the region's domestic equids. These developments meant different things for their feral cousins. Some were prized more than ever. Others were gunned down and destroyed. Finally, many of the wealthiest people in the South began spending exorbitant sums of money cultivating ever more rei ned domestic dogs, even as the region's rapidly expanding cities waged an ongoing extermination campaign against their cultivars' admixed, free-ranging cousins.
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Having reviewed the historical conditions that created and later sustained feral populations over the past several centuries, Chapter 6 examines how dogs, pigs, and horses are faring in the modern South (1945 to the present). The reproductive boundaries distinguishing their domestic and feral representatives are more pronounced, and thus more evolutionary signii cant, than ever before. People in the South spend
